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INTRODUCTION 
 
Democracy is essentially a matter of political method. Democracy is not a 
particular kind of civilization: it is rather a civilized way of taking political 
action. 
Bassett, Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy, 1935. 
      
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and consequently the collapse of the 
communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the doors were opened to the advancements 
of the ex-socialistic countries towards democracy. The ex-Soviet Union satellites began 
its transition towards a society in which the ruling power is in the hands of the people for 
the good of the community as a whole and in which a constitution represents the main act 
of a country through which a state guarantees basic personal and political rights, 
including fair and free elections and independent courts of law. This process towards 
democracy has been initiated and influenced by the development of political societies in 
these countries that based on different political options created a new pluralistic system. 
 
Aims and Objectives  
 
This paper will examine the development of the political societies in transitioning 
Poland and Hungary from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 till the return of reformed 
communists to power – in Poland in 1993 and in Hungary in 1994. It would be beyond 
the scope of this paper to analyze the transition process as a whole in these two countries 
and would solely focus on the transition of these countries’ political societies in this 
period. The main idea of the paper was to give some reasoning behind the different 
concepts of the development of political societies in these two countries and to argue that 
the Hungarian political system developed a better defined political society with more 
stable governments.  
 
 
 
Vladimir Ilic 
ÖMES 
 4
Project Outline  
 
Starting with a conceptualization of the framework of this research, the author of 
this paper examined available data and structured the paper as follows: the first part 
presents a brief overview of the communist era in Poland and Hungary followed by the 
comparison of the roundtable negotiations in the two countries between the regime and 
opposition. The third part further gives parallel descriptions of reformist and communist-
successor parties that emerged after these negotiations and gives the analysis of the first 
democratic elections. The fourth part assesses the differences of the different roles that 
the institutions were given in the post-communist constitutions and examines the progress 
of political societies in the period between two election cycles.   
 
Time Planning  
 
• January 2012: Methodology selection. compilation of books and published 
academic works, outline of thesis and some preliminary writing;  
• February 2012: Re-reading material on Poland and Hungary’s political history 
and writing a very brief overview of their communist eras; 
• March 2012:  Writing about the Roundtable negotiations in two countries 
between the regime and the opposition; 
• April to June 2012: Comparing reformist and communist-successor parties by 
explaining how they fared in the first democratic elections and why. Moreover, 
another comparison is to be made: how the political society evolved in the period 
between two election cycles. Last but not least, shedding some light on the return 
of the reformed communists to power in the two courtiers. 
• July to August 2012: Editing of the work written. Emphasis is on logical 
consistency, making sure it has unassailable presentation of the information. 
Proofreading the whole paper. 
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Methodology 
 
The methodology used in the drafting process of this paper was mostly based on a desk 
review of existing documents, studies and available data. 
 
The Methodology which will be in place will be that of a quantitative method of 
deductive and outcome oriented research; by means of analysis of the relevant literature, 
such as documentary analysis. Official publications would be used in this case. These are 
coming from the Polish and Hungarian prominent authors as well as third party 
academics and the works they published on this topic.  
 
Before we proceed to the methodological approaches applied in this work, it would be 
useful t say a few words about the chosen literature used in this chapter.  
 
The book “Reflexive methodology: new vistas for qualitative research” is one of the 
pillar for this part of the essay since it’s a great work of an in-depth analysis of the central 
aspect of the research methodology. Its authors critically discuss a major streams and 
trends of the methodology bringing in all significant factors such as culture, language, 
perception, cognition, ideology and other thing that penetrate and are spread throughout 
the scientific activity. They have taken into consideration interconnectivity between 
hermeneutics, critical theory, postmodernism and post structuralism, discourse analysis, 
genealogy and feminism among others while at the same time pointing out a link between 
empirical research techniques and various research traditions opening a space for a 
qualitative study.  
 
“Studies in qualitative methodology” edited by professor Christopher Pole is another 
asset of this work. This study provides the reader with invaluable insight into visual 
methods of research across the social science and its increasingly important role in social 
science. This book consist of a group of studies gather by professor Pole in order to 
provide a more or less holistic picture of the various approaches to qualitative 
methodology and its various forms. The method of conducting a qualitative research 
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using ethnographic visual data has become increasingly popular among the researchers 
recently. However, it is hard to find some accurate studies within the field. That is one of 
the reasons why I consider this book being of great importance. 
 
 
In Charles Busha and Steven Harter’s book “Research methods in librarianship, 
techniques and interpretation”, the authors give a thorough introduction to methods for 
research in library and information science. It provides both theoretical and practical 
insight and targets various audiences, from beginners to researches on advanced levels. 
There are variety of methods, techniques and approaches used in this paper. Some of 
them are used by the author, and some of them as been incorporated indirectly. These 
include historical approach, reflexive and qualitative research, comparative analysis, 
visual ethnographic methods.  
 
Let’s take a closer look on the main approaches in this master thesis: 
 
Historical approach 
 
The historical method of research applies to all fields of study because it encompasses 
their: origins, growth, theories, personalities, crisis, etc. Both quantitative and qualitative 
variables can be used in the collection of historical information. Once the decision is 
made to conduct historical research, there are steps that should be followed to achieve a 
reliable result. Charles Busha and Stephen Harter detail six steps for conducting historical 
research: 
 1. The recognition of a historical problem or the identification of a need for certain 
historical knowledge. 
 2. The gathering of as much relevant information about the problem or topic as 
possible. 
 3. If appropriate, the forming of hypothesis that tentatively explain relationships 
between historical factors. 
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 4. The rigorous collection and organization of evidence, and the verification of the 
authenticity and veracity of information and its sources. 
 5. The selection, organization, and analysis of the most pertinent collected evidence, 
and the drawing of conclusions; and 
6. The recording of conclusions in a meaningful narrative.1  
In the field of library and information science, there are a vast array of topics that 
may be considered for conducting historical research. For example, a researcher may 
chose to answer questions about the development of school, academic or public libraries, 
the rise of technology and the benefits/ problems it brings, the development of 
preservation methods, famous personalities in the field, library statistics, or geographical 
demographics and how they effect library distribution. Harter and Busha define library 
history as “the systematic recounting of past events pertaining to the establishment, 
maintenance, and utilization of systematically arranged collections of recorded 
information or knowledge….A biography of a person who has in some way affected the 
development of libraries, library science, or librarianship is also considered to be library 
history.2 
 
There are a variety of places to obtain historical information. Primary Sources are 
the most sought after in historical research.  Primary resources are first hand accounts of 
information. Some examples of primary documents are: personal diaries, eyewitness 
accounts of events, and oral histories.  “Secondary sources of information are records or 
accounts prepared by someone other than the person, or persons, who participated in or 
observed an event.”  Secondary resources can be very useful in giving a researcher a 
grasp on a subject and may provided extensive bibliographic information for delving 
further into a research topic.3 
 
                                                 
1 Charles H. Busha and Stephen P. Harter, Research Methods in Librarianship: Techniques and 
Interpretation (New York: Academic Press, 1980),  91. 
2 Charles H. Busha and Stephen P. Harter, Research Methods in Librarianship: Techniques and 
Interpretation (New York: Academic Press, 1980),  93. 
3 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications, 2003),  252. 
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In any type of historical research, there are issues to consider.  Harter and Busha list 
three principles to consider when conducting historical research: 
 1. Consider the slant or biases of the information you are working with and the ones 
possessed by the historians themselves. 
 This is particularly true of qualitative research.  Consider an example provided 
by Gaye Tuchman: 
 
Let us assume that women’s letters and diaries are pertinent to ones research 
question and that one can locate pertinent examples.  One cannot simply read them….one 
must read enough examples to infer the norms of what could be written and how it could 
be expressed. For instance, in the early nineteenth century, some (primarily female) 
schoolteachers instructed girls in journal writing and read their journals to do so. How 
would such instruction have influenced the journals kept by these girls as adults It is 
useful to view the nineteenth-century journal writer as an informant.  Just as one tries to 
understand how a contemporary informant speaks from specific social location, so too 
one would want to establish the social location of the historical figure.  One might ask of 
these and other diaries: What is the characteristic of middle-class female diary writers?  
What is the characteristic of this informant?  How should one view what this informant 
writes? 
 b.    Quantitative facts may also be biased in the types of statistical data collected or in 
how that information was interpreted by the researcher. 
 2. There are many factors that can contribute to “historical episodes”.  
 3. Evidence should not be examined from a singular point of view.4 
  
                                                 
4 Charles H. Busha and Stephen P. Harter, Research Methods in Librarianship: Techniques and 
Interpretation (New York: Academic Press, 1980),  99-100. 
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Qualitative research  
  
 By no means is one of the main criteria a focus on the material, an “in-depth” 
analysis of it. It is not so much about the categorization although some qualitative 
approaches needs that categorization process. The empirical material should be open and 
equivocal, and one of the most important features for qualitative study is that starts from 
the perspectives and actions of the subject studied, not from the researcher’s ideas and 
categorizations. Authors of the book Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg rely heavily on 
Denzin and Lincoln’s interpretation of qualitative research model: it is about situated 
activity that locates observer in the world. It is about a set of interpretative practices that 
transform the world and make it visible. At this level, by definition this is an 
interpretative, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that these kinds of study 
attempt to make sense of phenomena and meanings that people bring to them.5  
 
Speaking of the qualitative research method, it involves many different aspects 
such as interviewing informant/s for instance. In a case of ethnographic researchers, they 
are simply “collecting “the text” that does not exist “out there”, texts like one’s vision of 
the history or someone’s life story. These kinds of materials are often used in historical 
context and are of narrative nature.6 
 
In order to motivate why did I picked up qualitative instead of quantitative 
research method; it is simply because I find it the most suitable and appropriate model for 
this research. Alvesson and Sköldberg put it this way: a common view is that the choice 
between qualitative and quantitative methods cannot be made in the abstract, it is strictly 
related to the particular object or a problem of study.7 This goes along my reasoning 
                                                 
5 Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research (Los 
Angeles: SAGE, 2009), 7. 
6 Christopher J. Pole, Seeing Is Believing?: Approaches to Visual Research (Amsterdam: Elsevier JAI, 
2004), 63. 
7 Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research (Los 
Angeles: SAGE, 2009), 8. 
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behind the problematic of the transitioning societies of Hungary and Poland and my own 
reflections of it.  
Reflexive research 
 
This method is very similar to reflective research, researchers sometimes use them 
synonymously as Alvesson and Sköldberg, and sometimes they point out the tiny 
distinction between them. Reflexive method if often viewed as a particular version of the 
reflective one, reflecting on several levels and several themes.8 However, none of this is a 
subject of this paper. Study in reflexive research is a complex science. According to 
Bourdieu and Wacquant there are several kinds of reflexivity. It involves everything from 
ethno-methodological ethnography, studies of natural sciences, postmodern sociology, 
critical phenomenology and double hermeneutics. Some other discussions consider 
sociology of knowledge and politics of conducting and publishing scientific research.9 
Alvesson and Sköldberg advocates for a four areas that any social researcher should be 
engaged in regardless from methods he prefers. These are as follows: 
 
1. Systematic and techniques in research procedures: it is about an essence of the 
qualitative method; all qualitative research need to follow some reasonable logic 
in relation to empirical data, and use strictly refined techniques when processing 
it. 
2. Clarification of the primacy of interpretation: The key word here is hermeneutics. 
Since all research work is driven by an interpreter who often interacts with the 
work of other interpreters, this method simply cannot be separated from other 
theory and pre-understanding because assumptions and notions determine 
representation of the object of study.      
3. Awareness of the ideological-political character of research: All social science is 
embedded in a political and ethical context. What and how things are explored 
determines whether they are going to gain necessary social support, it is not 
independent of social conditions. This is why interpretations and theoretical 
                                                 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
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assumptions on which the former one’s are based is a part of and even help to 
construct both political and ideological conditions. 
4. Reflection in relation to the problem of representation and authority: It is about 
text living its own life, completely separated from the author and external reality. 
It is about texts that actually affect each other and creating chaos of mutual 
influences. This leads to fragmentation of the text and its split up. Postmodernism 
and recent hermeneutics for instance teach this view. One should be aware that if 
critical “eye-glasses” are dropped, both the subject and the object of research 
could be questioned.10 
 
Limitations  
 
It is important to stress here that this paper will not deal with transitions of 
Hungary and Poland, but rather with the transitions of their political societies. This might 
prove the main edge of its paper given that it aims at narrowing down the research onto 
only political societies unlike numerous previously explored predictable papers.  
 
The brief analysis of the development of political societies in Hungary and Poland 
must remain incomplete. It was beyond the scope of this paper to examine the broader 
political and social context in which these developments have occurred. However, the 
political models opted by Hungary and Poland on its way towards democracy illustrate a 
political method by which ‘every citizen has the opportunity of participating through 
discussion in an attempt to reach voluntary agreement as to what shall be done for the 
good of the community as a whole.’11      
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research (Los 
Angeles: SAGE, 2009), 11. 
11 E. F. M. Durbin, The Politics of Democratic Socialism; an Essay on Social Policy. (London: G. 
Routledge & Sons, 1940), 233. 
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Literature Review 
 
 This paper will be relying heavily on historical literature starting from the 
books of general history to those pinpointing the development of political events within 
one specific national history, such as Polish or Hungarian. I also surveyed the literature 
on the political processes and institutions in Central and Eastern Europe in order to 
acquire a broader account of its political history and, preferably, a more comprehensive 
guide to comparative politics dominating the two countries.    Additionally, the author has 
in mind to draw more detailed information from such sources as historical articles written 
by renowned academics and punished either online or in paperback scholarly journals. 
Last but not least, a substantial number of voluminous reference works offering 
comprehensive information on all or specialized areas of knowledge relevant for this 
research. 
 
In doing so, the author will be using various resources to be able to gather 
all the material needed for this research. My private library encompasses no more than a 
modest selection of history books providing a possibly too broad account of historical 
events. For this reason, I have found more material in a number of university libraries, 
among which Roskilde University Library and Orkanen Library at Malmö University will 
play the most significant roles. Their electronic platforms provide users with an extensive 
body of literature, including numerous journals and articles which help conduct a more 
in-depth analysis of historical events. Here I also need to stress the significance of the 
material I found in the catalogue of the Warsaw University Library (Polish: Biblioteka 
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego), aiming at obtaining information from the inside published 
by Polish writers, and not only by the Anglo-Saxon ones. 
 
Among others, I would like to mention a book entitled “Central and East 
European Politics: From Communism to Democracy” edited by Sharon L. Wolchik and 
Jane L. Curry. This long-needed text surveys the new members of the European Union 
together with both the problems and potentials they bring to the region of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Unambiguously and comprehensively, the book provides the reader with 
an authoritative and up-to-date analysis of the political transformations in the region. 
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Divided into two parts, it presents a series of comparative country case studies, including 
EU expansion, political reform, the economic transition and its social ramifications. 
Renowned scholars provide the historical context for the current situation of each country 
in the region. They give details of how communism ended and how democratic politics 
has emerged or was struggling to emerge in its wake, but they also describe the individual 
countries’ roads of transforming their economies, the extent to which their populations 
have been affected by hurried and tormenting changes, and how foreign policy making 
has evolved. For this research, the book will be an invaluable resource on the newly 
democratizing states of Europe.  
 
As regards material on the history of Poland, a colleague of mine, Jaroslaw 
Krecz, recommended an encyclopedia published in several tomes entitled “The Popular 
Universal Enyclopedia” (Polish: Popularna Encyklopedia Powszechna). Mister Krecs is 
an alumnus of Faculty of Applied Linguistics and East-Slavonic Philology from the 
University of Warsaw. Also, he is the one I place trust upon regarding the translation 
from Polish to English. The author of this thesis substantiates his belief on the fact that 
Jaroslaw has been a praiseworthy colleague in a non-governmental organization working 
as an interpreter and having a command of both languages gained through long previous 
experience.  
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OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNIST ERA IN POLAND AND HUNGARY 
 
Background 
 
When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 it marked a watershed in European 
history – the forty-four year long communist experiment in Central and Eastern Europe 
was finally over. One by one the former Soviet satellites were gaining independence and 
it looked like they were on a steady course to democratization. Poland was the most 
troublesome of USSR’s allies during the Cold War and was the first country to get a non-
communist prime minister after the collapse of the regime.12 On the other hand, Hungary 
had already patented its “goulash communism” in the decades after the unsuccessful 1956 
uprising and it was among the first candidates to begin the transition to democracy. It 
was, mostly because of the developed secondary economy that came as a byproduct of 
Kadar’s New Economic Mechanism (NEM) of 1968.13  
 
One of the main arenas of democratization and democracy consolidation is the 
political society.14 This is why it is important to compare how it developed in different 
environments in the first couple of years after the fall of communism.  
 
The transition of political societies in Hungary and Poland from 1989 to the return 
of reformed communists to power in 1993 in Poland and in 1994 in Hungary illustrates 
the different political options made and the differences in the development of political 
society in these countries. The time frame chosen has its significance.  The year of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) was taken as a starting point. This is the year when the 
transition started at the roundtable meetings in both countries. Further, in 1993 after the 
parliamentary elections the reformed communists came back to power in Poland, while 
the same happened in Hungary in 1994. It is important to examine why this has happened 
                                                 
12 Frances Millard, “Poland,” In Developments in Central and East European Politics 3, edited by Stephen 
White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 23. 
13Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 147. 
14Juan J. Linz, and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe  (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 8. 
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so soon after the fall of communism, practically in the second free elections since the 
revival of political plurality in these countries. 
  
 Although the reformed communists came back to power at roughly the same time 
in both countries, the differently negotiated transitions in Poland and Hungary resulted in 
the latter’s party system fared easier in the beginning, with more stable governments and 
better defined political society. One can argue that the return to power of the reformed 
communists in the mid 1990s cannot be attributed to the sudden understanding of 
ordinary citizens that the communism had worked after all but to the  point that different 
ideologies and testing  of different political options for the first time in the second half of 
the 20th century have been rejected. 
 
In order to better understand the legacy of the past, Schopflin rightfully argues 
that communism as the apotheosis of etatism did leave a substantial legacy in the 
ambition for the society to be as economically homogeneous as possible.15 People came 
out of that period believing that there should not be clear-cut winners and losers, which is 
inherent in capitalism. Even the anti-communists and dissidents that swept to power in 
1989 and 1990 had to bear this in mind as the governments often intervened to cushion 
the blows of transition. This is why Polish voters kept looking for the government and 
president that could raise their living standard without making them change their attitude 
toward work and social welfare. It lead to parliamentary elections in 1989, 1991, and 
1993 with very different results, including the election of Lech Walesa in 1990 and his 
removal from the office in the 1995 after the presidential elections.  
 
As Tismaneanu noted, the old ideas were exhausted and time made them obsolete 
yet new ones were still in a haze while corruption, political fragmentation and infighting 
were compromising them as well.16 This is why some political parties, like the Hungarian 
Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) or Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) 
                                                 
15George Schopflin, "Obstacles to Liberalism in Post-Communist Politics," East European Politics and 
Societies, (Winter 1991), 191. 
16Vladimir Tismaneanu , Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist 
Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 42. 
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went back into the pre-war period to find political programs and ideas for the 21st 
century. In addition to this, scores of political parties flooded the political scene of both 
countries and too often nothing separated them except personal grievances and 
unresolved conflicts. For example, twenty-nine parties and coalitions competed in the 
1991 Polish parliamentary elections and most of them had roots in Solidarity. 
    
 
Poland and Hungary under Communism 
 
Both Poland and Hungary came out of the Second World War as countries 
occupied by the Soviet Union. Stalin’s idea was to impose the Soviet Communist 
dominance following the years after the end of World War II over the People's Republic 
of Poland. His plan was to install obedient puppet regimes that would in effect extend his 
power throughout the region although he needed to make it look as though the people in 
these countries wanted communists to take over. These years were marred by political 
unrest. 
 
This is why the new master of Eastern Europe decided to organize show elections, 
which would legitimize the new regime. In Poland’s case, to conciliate the United States 
and the United Kingdom, Joseph Stalin had previously promised to Churchill and 
Roosevelt at the February 1945 Yalta Conference that a coalition government would be 
formed. The coalition government would have been composed of the communist Polish 
Workers' Party, members of the pro-Western Polish government in exile, and members of 
the Armia Krajowa ("Home Army") resistance movement, as well as to give his consent 
to holding free elections.17 However, he failed to mention that all key posts would be held 
by communists. The domination over Polish territories passed from the occupying forces 
of Nazi Germany to the Red Army and from the Red Army to the Polish Communists, 
who held the largest influence under the provisional government. Hungary presents a 
drastic example because the communists won only 17% of the vote after the first postwar 
                                                 
17 "The Historical Setting: The Polish People's Republic," The Historical Setting: The Polish People's 
Republic, Chapter 6: The Polish People's Republic, accessed April 13, 2012,  http://info-
poland.buffalo.edu/classroom/longhist6.html. 
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elections in that country. However, they received the key Ministry of the Interior and 
immediately set up the secret police that had done everything to suppress other points of 
view. Led by Gabor Peter among others, the secret police ruthlessly persecuted all 'class 
enemies' and 'enemies of the people'. The end result in both countries was the same – the 
communists participated in coalition governments as long as it took in order to take all 
the power in the country, mostly through the Ministry of the Interior and with the help of 
the Red Army which was a de facto occupying force. Even before the entering of Red 
Army into Poland, the Soviet Union was being engaged in a carefully calculated strategy 
to eliminate anti-Communist opposition forces to make sure that Poland would fall under 
its sphere of influence.18 Thus, the Polish United Workers’ Party and Hungarian Working 
People’s Party became monopolists in the political arenas of these countries. 
 
The Polish Communists, led by Gomułka and Bierut, were quite familiar with the 
fact that they lacked support among the general population. In preference to the 
parliamentary elections, a national plebiscite termed the "3 times YES" referendum (3 
razy TAK; 3×TAK), was held first.19 Aiming at checking he popularity of communist 
initiatives in Poland, this referendum encompassed three practically general, but 
politically charged questions about the Senate, national industries and western borders. 
Despite Mikołajczyk's PSL’s endeavors to gather all the supporters to oppose the 
abolition of the senate, most of the important parties at the time were leftist. The actual 
results, which were later on reconstructed by PSL, showed that the communists gained 
little support. And even though ballots counted in Krakow proved that only 16% of the 
population voted in favor of their proposed Option One, the all-encompassing electoral 
fraud coupled with coercion secured the communists a majority in the watchfully 
controlled poll. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Tadeusz Piotrowski, Poland's Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and 
Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1998), 88. 
19 "New Communist Rule," En.poland.gov.pl, accessed April 13, 2012, 
http://en.poland.gov.pl/New,Communist,rule,,7306.html. 
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The Communists strengthened their positions by slowly but surely weakening the 
rights of their non-Communist foes, for the most part by suppressing the leading 
opposition party - Mikołajczyk's Polish People's Party (PSL). In a number of instances, 
their ostensible enemies were being sentenced to death on trumped up charges - among 
them Witold Pilecki, the coordinator of the Auschwitz resistance, innumerable leaders of 
Armia Krajowa and the Council of National Unity.20 
 
Countless resistance fighters were either assassinated or forced to exile against all 
the legal proceedings. Additionally, the opposition members were also persecuted by 
administrative means. Although the ongoing persecution of the former anti-Nazi 
organizations by state security compelled thousands of partisans to withdraw into forests, 
the actions of the Ministry of Public Security of Poland (UB, Polish secret police), 
NKVD and Red Army increasingly lessened their numbers. To top it all, a new pro-
government Front of National Unity was created. It comprehended solely the forerunners 
of the communist Polish United Workers' Party along with its leftist allies. By the year 
1946, all rightist parties had been outlawed.21 
 
The Stalinist era saw a merciless pursuit of socialist ideological ideals and 
production goals as both countries attempted to industrialize their agricultural economies. 
In Hungary, the state controlled most of the economy by 1950 given that all large and 
mid-sized industrial companies, mines, plants, banks of all kind along with foreign trade 
and companies of retail were nationalized without any compensation.  
 
Also, the political opposition was squashed and it was understood that all major 
decisions were made in the Kremlin. In 1948 the USA announced the Marshall Plan 
initiative to assist the rebuilding of Europe in its attempt to increase more political power 
in postwar conditions. Initially, the government welcomed the idea of Poland's 
participation in the plan. What happened soon afterwards is that the Polish government 
                                                 
20 "Polska. Historia." Encyklopedia PWN, accessed April 13, 2012, 
http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo.php?id=4575043. 
21 "The Historical Setting: The Polish People's Republic," The Historical Setting: The Polish People's 
Republic, Chapter 6: The Polish People's Republic, accessed April 13, 2012,  http://info-
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had to repudiate the offer of help under pressure from Moscow.22 In addition, the Soviet 
Union was compelling Poland to dismiss its claims to compensation from Germany in the 
aftermath of the uprising in East Germany. Consequently, this resulted in no significant 
compensation for war damages, either to the Polish state or to its citizens.23 Not only did 
the beginning of the wealth gap ensue, but it also increased in years to come as the 
Western market economies grew much more quickly than the centrally planned socialist 
economies of Eastern Europe. 
 
The Polish government at that time was headed by Cyrankiewicz and Hilary 
Minc, a Marxist economist. Together, they launched a series of sweeping programs of 
economic reform and national reconstruction. The Stalinist turn eventually led to the 
ascension of Bierut, which now implied that Poland would be more or less leveled with 
the Soviet model. Instead of the market-oriented economy embellished with the façade of 
democracy, the combination which had been maintained until the year 1948,24 both a 
“people’s republic” and a centrally planned socialist economy were brought into focus. 
What put the finishing touches on Soviet-style centralized planning was the Six-Year 
Plan created in 1950.25 This plan put emphasis onto two relatively interconnected 
spheres: the development of heavy industry and collectivization of agriculture. In the 
latter case, the planned eventually proved futile since the land seized from prewar large 
landowners was reallocated to the derived peasants. Subsequently, redistributing the 
fertile cropland from farmers to peasant resulted in deep resentment. The period was 
termed “the battle for trade” and is characterized by privatizing trade and nationalizing 
industry. Within a span of only a couple of years, the private shopkeepers vanished from 
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Poland.26 It remained the sole country from the Soviet bloc where individual peasants 
would continue to dominate agriculture.                  
      
This is why it did not come as a surprise when the countries in the region one by 
one decided to officially become people’s republics, which cemented the rule of the 
communists – in Hungary this happened in 1949 and in Poland in 1952. 
 
On the one hand, the constitution of 1952 warranted universal free health care. 
Moreover, the Stalinist regime brought about fundamental changes to the education 
system at the beginning of the 1950s. The Communist strategy for introducing free and 
compulsory school for everyone was well received. The establishment of neoteric 
institutions, such as free universities enjoyed widespread support.27  
 
On the other hand, the communists succeeded in screening out which pieces of 
information and, therefore, interpretations were to be taught and learned. History along 
with the rest of other social sciences was obliged to abide by Marxist views approved by 
ideological censorship. Simultaneously, a vast number of prewar faculties and staff of the 
universities were written off by the new regime between 1951 and 1953 just because they 
were perceived as “reactionary”. Furthermore, the government strengthened its control by 
gaining a hold of the art scene including all the “unfavorable” artists. The only acceptable 
and by the authorities welcomed formula in the period after 1949 was the Soviet-style 
Socialist Realism. Not only did the majority of works of art and literature exposed to 
public have to be in agreement with the voice of the Party, but a number of them also 
needed to help mounting the government propaganda machine.28    
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Notwithstanding these highly controversial reforms, a relatively noteworthy 
faction of the population greeted the changes with relief. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War, innumerable citizens were ready to come to terms with Communist rule in 
exchange for the restoration of comparatively normal life. This is why several tens of 
thousands opted for jining the communist party, thus keenly supporting the regime.29  
 
Nevertheless, a latent dissatisfaction among the people remained present. 
Similarly, a number of the Poles acquired an attitude which might be depicted as either 
“resigned” or “reluctant collaboration”. On the other side, the remnants of the Armia 
Krajowa as well as Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, who remained known as the cursed soldiers 
in the history, vehemently opposed the Communists. Their vision was that of the eventual 
World War III which would liberate Poland. However, whereas the majority of them 
surrendered during the amnesty of 1947, the secret police brutally repressed many of 
them back into the forests, where only a handful of them went on fighting well into the 
1950s.30 
 
Further, numerous Poles felt disaffected given that the Communists persecuted 
the Catholic Church.31 In 1947, The Stowarzyszenie PAX was created. This association 
aimed at undermining the grass-root support from Roman Catholicism while at the same 
time attempting to construct a Church which would favor communism. Even though he 
had been previously willing to find the middle ground with the government, Stefan 
Wyszynski, who was at the time the Cardinal Primate of Poland, was put under house 
arrest.32 The war against religious institutions, organized by secret police in the early 
1950s, took the form of torturing and detaining a vast number of Polish religious leaders 
and other personalities. The series of armed raids culminated in the Stalinist show trial of 
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the Krakow Curia. The Office of the Council of Ministers (Urząd Rady Ministrów) 
created a list of those Bishops the government-would approve.33 
 
What legitimately established Poland as a People’s Republic, governed by the 
Polish United Workers’ Party, was the new Polish Constitution of 1952. The Polish 
United Workers’ Party had been the Communist Party’s official name since the 
absorption of the left wing of the Socialist Party in 1948. After the post of President of 
Poland had been abolished, the First Secretary of the Communist Party named Bierut 
became the effective leader of Poland.34 
 
Stalinist era in Hungary marks somewhat different set of events. The chief 
secretary of the Hungarian Working People’s Party, Matyas Rakosi, was at the same time 
de facto the leader of Hungary. He held virtually unrestricted power and stipulated 
obedience from fellow members of the party, including his most trusted associates, Erno 
Gero and Mihaly Farkas. Upon their return from Moscow to Hungary, all three of them 
spent a long period of time maintaining close ties to eminent Soviet leaders. During the 
war in Hungary, the so-called “Hungarian” Communists were in charge of the illegal 
party operating within the Hungarian Working People’s Party. Being significantly more 
popular within party ranks, they were the synonyms for the trio’s arch-rivals. Laszlo 
Rajk, who was among their most high-ranking leaders, held the position of the minister of 
foreign affairs at that time. However, he was detained in May 1949 on the premise that he 
committed quite surreal crimes, such as being a spy for both Western imperialist powers 
and for Yugoslavia (which, regardless of the fact that it was a communist country as well, 
was in unfavorable relations with the Soviet Union). In the end, he was forced to make a 
full confession of being an agent of Leon Trotsky, Miklos Horthy, Josip Broz Tito and 
Western imperialists at his trial in September 1949. Additionally, he had to admitted the 
responsibility for taking part in a murder plot against Emo Gero and Matyas Rakosi. 
Laszlo Rajk was found guilty and, consequently, executed. Other leaders of the party, 
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such as former Social Democrats and Hungarian illegal communists, were also deemed 
deceitful and untrustworthy in the following three years. Among the most prominent 
figure was Janos Kadar, who was arrested and imprisoned on trumped-up charges.35  
 
  This showcase trial of Laszlo Rajk is taken as the starting point of the most 
horrible period in the Rakosi dictatorship. Matyas Rakosi endeavored to impose 
totalitarian regime on the whole country. The centrally coordinated personality cult was 
now focused on him. Further Joseph Stalin almost immediately reached unprecedented 
proportions. Not only were the busts and the pictures of Rakosi seen all over the place, 
but the majority of public speakers gained a new purpose: to lionize the leader’s political 
acumen. In the intervening time, leading the secret police through Gabor Peter, Rakosi 
himself ruthlessly persecuted everyone he perceived to be a “class enemy” and “enemy of 
the people”. An estimated 2,000 citizens were put to death and over 100,000 were 
incarcerated. More than 44,000 people were confined to forced-labor camps, where a 
great number of them died because of adverse or unsafe work conditions, malnutrition, 
and basically deprivation of any medical care. An additional number of 15,000 people, 
chiefly industrialists, army generals, former aristocrats and upper-class citizens were 
deported from Budapest and other major cities to rural areas where they were compelled 
to carry out grueling agricultural labor. Once these policies were opposed by some 
members of the Hungarian Working People’s Party, Rakosi took an even more rigorous 
step and expelled about 200,000 of them out of the organization. 
 
Rakosi followed Soviet economic policies unquestionably. Even though Hungary 
was entirely deficient in iron ore, he declared that the country would become a “country 
of iron and steel.” The forced growth of heavy industry served military purpose, which 
was meant to turn into preparation for the imminent World War III against Western 
imperialists. While the country’s vast areas were still in ruins dating back from the war, a 
lopsided amount of Hungary’s resources were spent on building plants and constructing 
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whole industrial cities from scratch. Ironically enough, the textile and agricultural 
industries, being traditional strengths of Hungary, were now abandoned.  
 
The Hungarian government made an attempt to force independent peasants to join 
agricultural co-operatives in which they would become no more than paid laborers, but 
many of them obstinately resisted. The government retaliated by imposing even stricter 
requirements of obligatory food quotas on peasants’ produce. Similarly to the situation in 
Poland, affluent peasants, named ‘kulaks’ in the Russian language, were labeled ‘class 
enemies’ and burdened with all kinds of discrimination, including confinements and loss 
of property. Among them were some of the most skillful farmers who were withdrawn 
from production. In the end, this deceasing agricultural output led to an invariable 
scarcity of food, particularly meat. 
 
The education system was swiftly expanded by Rakosi in Hungary. What he 
attempted was to substitute the educated class of the past by a new “working 
intelligentsia” – a term Rakosi himself would bring into play. Other than outcomes such 
as improved education for the poor, better opportunities for the children from working 
class families and amplified literacy levels in general, this measure also implied the 
propagation of Communist ideology throughout educational institutions. Nearly each and 
every religious school was turned into state ownership as part of an attempt to detach the 
Church from the State. Furthermore, religious teachings were denounced as retrograde 
propaganda and were slowly but surely eliminated from schools. 
 
Systematically, one by one, the Hungarian churches were intimidated. Cardinal 
Jozsef Mindszenty, for example, was a figure who bravely opposed the German Nazis 
and the Hungarian Fascists during World War II. In December 1948, the cardinal was 
accused of treason and arrested. After having been physically tortured for about five 
weeks, he owned up to the charges against him. Consequently, he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. The Protestant churches suffered from no weaker prosecution: they were 
purged and their leaders were replaced by the ones who were keen on remaining faithful 
to Rakosi government. The new Hungarian army hurriedly organized public, pre-
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arranged trials to eradicate ‘Nazi remnants and imperialist saboteurs’. In 1951, a number 
of officers were sentenced and put to death – including a 28 victory—scoring fighter ace 
of the Second World War Royal Hungarian Air Force, Lajos Toth, who had on his own 
free will returned from the US captivity only to support the revival of Hungarian 
aviation.36                      
 
 
Stalin died in 1953, which gave rise to new cadres in the communist parties as 
they took over the positions previously held by the late dictator’s most loyal disciples. 
Rakosi was removed from power in Hungary in 1956 while Poland’s Bierut managed to 
hold on to power until Wladyslaw Gomulka took over the party in the same year. Since 
Gomulka had already been relieved from this position by the Soviets in 1948 this was 
interpreted in Hungary as the abdication of Moscow in Eastern Europe, and because the 
communist leaders headed by Rakosi had failed to dissociate themselves from Stalin’s 
policies it fueled the protests that rocked Hungary in 1956.37 
 
While Gomulka was trying to reestablish firm grip on Poland, protests started in 
Budapest on October 23rd. A group of students staged a peaceful demonstration, creating 
a list of 16 demands for both reformation and greater political freedom. After the students 
had attempted to broadcast these demands, police put several of them under arrest and 
used tear gas so as to disperse the crowd. Consequently, the students made an attempt to 
free those under arrest, but the police opened fire on the crowd, triggering a series of 
events that led to the Hungarian Revolution.38 
 
During that night, soldiers together with commissioned officers joined the 
demonstrating students on the streets of Budapest. After the protesters brought down 
Stalin’s statue, they began chanting: "Away with Gero!", "Long Live Nagy!", and 
“Russians go home!” Responding to this development, The Central Committee of the 
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Hungarian Working People's Party made an urgent request for Soviet military 
intervention. Simultaneously, the Committee came to a decision that Imre Nagy ought to 
become head of a new government. At 2 a.m. on 24 October, Soviet military tanks 
entered Hungarian capital.39                         
 
The following day, Soviet troops opened fire on protestors in Parliament Square. 
A journalist who was at the scene counted 12 dead bodies and estimated that another 170 
had been critically wounded. In response, the Central Committee of the Hungarian 
Working People's Party exerted pressure on Erno Gero to resign from office, thus 
replacing him with Janos Kadar. Radio Kossuth now aired Imre Nagy’s annunciation that 
he had taken over the leadership of the Government as Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers. in his speech, he promised:    
  
"The far-reaching democratization of Hungarian public life, the realization of a 
Hungarian road to socialism in accord with our own national characteristics, and 
the realization of our lofty national aim: the radical improvement of the workers' 
living conditions."40 
 
The names that supported Nagy’s policies include Geza Losonczy, Antal Apro, 
Zoltan Szabo Karoly, Kiss Ferenc Munnich, and Janos Kadar. On 28 October, they 
succeeded in taking control of the Hungarian Working People's Party. At the same time, 
his caused the creation of local national committees and revolutionary workers' councils 
all over the country.41  
 
The articles of the government newspaper, Szabad Nep (i.e. Free People), 
accurately reflected on the change of leadership in the party. Openly criticizing Soviet 
attempts to jeopardize the political situation in Hungary, the newspaper welcomed the 
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new government with open arms on 29 October. This standpoint was backed up by Radio 
Miskolc which called for the instantaneous withdrawal of Soviet military troops from 
Hungary.42 
   
Imre Nagy made the announcement on 30 October claiming that he would free 
Cardinal József Mindszenty and several more political prisoners. Also, he notified the 
public that his government was aiming at abolishing the one arty state. This was followed 
by proclamations of Anna Kethly, Ferenc Farkas and Zoltan Tildy regarding the 
restitution of the following political parties: the Social Democratic Party, the 
Smallholders Party and the Petofi Party (formerly named the Peasants Party). 
 
On 1 November, Nagy made the most controversial decision; not only did he 
announce that Hungary planned on withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, but he also 
proclaimed the country’s neutrality. To support his plan, he requested from the United 
Nations to become involved in Hungarian dispute with the Soviet Union.            
 
The details of Nagy’s coalition government were announced on 3 November. The 
coalition was to include three members of the Social Democratic Party (Joseph Fischer, 
Anna Kethly and Gyula Keleman), another three members of the Smallholders Party 
(Istvan Szabo, Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs), two Petofi Peasants (Ferenc Farkas and 
Istvan Bibo) and Communists (Geza Losonczy, Janos Kadar and Georg Lukacs). Pal 
Maleter was appointed minister of defense.43 
 
  The leader of the Soviet Union at that time was Nikita Khrushchev. The above-
mentioned development of events in Hungary became a matter of concern for him so he 
decided on sending the Red Army into Hungary on 4 November 1956. The Hungarian 
bridges, airfields and highway intersections were instantly captured by Soviet tanks. 
Although the fighting took place throughout the country’s territory, it lasted a short space 
of time. In the end, Hungarian forces were defeated.             
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In the course of the Hungarian Uprising, an estimated 20,000 thousand people lost 
their lives, almost all of them during the Soviet intervention. After Imre Nagy had been 
put under arrest, Janos Kadar – the Soviet loyalist – replaced him. Nagy was held captive 
until they put him to death in 1958. Geza Losonczy, Pal Maleter, Miklos Gimes and 
Attila Szigethy along with other government ministers or supporters were either executed 
or died in captivity.44 
 
The 8th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was held in 1962, six 
years after the end of the Hungarian Uprising. The Congress declared that the period of 
"consolidation of socialism" after 1956 was to be over. According to the declaration, the 
"foundations for the establishment of a socialist society" had been attained, which 
practically enabled a general amnesty of most people sentenced pertaining to 1956. 
The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, now being under the leadership of Janos Kadar, 
embarked on curbing some of the excesses of the secret police. Moreover, the party 
introduced a moderately liberal cultural and economic course planning to overcome the 
post-1956 hostility toward the Kadar government. 
 
This proved to be crucial because Kadar declared the new policy of the party in 
the 1960s that stated “He who is not against us is with us”. This practically meant that the 
party did not expect to win over the masses any more. On the contrary, all that the party 
machine asked of its citizens was not to collude against it and in return for the passivity 
and abstention from all political activities the citizens were rewarded by higher standard 
of living that came as the result of decisions made in 1966. Namely, the Central 
Committee approved the “New Economic Mechanism” (NEM) which facilitated foreign 
trade, gave some degree of freedom to the workings of the market, and permitted a 
limited number of small businesses to function in the service sector. Although liberal 
when contrasted with Stalinist socialism, the initial relaxation of economic control was 
way too far from posing the same threat of the 1956 reforms. To administer the collective 
                                                 
44 Jenő Györkei and Miklós Horváth, Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956 (New York: Central 
European University Press, 1999), 350. 
Vladimir Ilic 
ÖMES 
 29
farms, the official policy employed various methods, leaving the pace of mechanization 
up to each cooperative. 
 
 In addition, the collectivizers used wages paid monthly in cash rather than 
carrying out the system of work day credit and enforced deliveries of harvested crop. 
Later on, during the 1960s, cooperatives were allowed to join interrelated and then 
general supplementary businesses i.e. light/service industry or food processing.45            
 
The new course of Hungarian government was called “goulash socialism”. It 
showed a much more serious concern for public opinion; rather than focusing on future, 
the course placed increased emphasis on the current well-being of the citizens when 
compared with the period preceding 1956. Goulash Socialism moderated the role of the 
Communist Party during the development of socialism: now interpreted as “serving” 
instead of “commanding”; it allowed a greater freedom for dissent than it was the case in 
other parts of the Soviet bloc; amplified the scope of societal self-expression and self-
management; lessened the formality of relations between the Party and the population as 
a whole; and last but not least, it refined the regulatory Marxist-Leninist ideology with 
adapted means of dissemination. This ideology is called upon in the wish to reform as 
presented in Imre Nagy’s “Reform Communism” (1955-6). Nagy claims that Marxism is  
 
“A science that cannot remain static but must develop and become more perfect… 
The theory of Marx - as Lenin stated – gives general guiding principles, which 
must be utilized in Britain in another fashion than in France, in France differently 
than…”46  
 
This way Nagy attributed Marx to having provided a method which was meant to 
conduct yet not entirely embrace socialism or its development. However, the Soviet 
leaders were not in favor of such interpretation of Marxist ideology. Both Leonid 
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Brezhnev’s response to Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Nikita Khrushchev’s to Hungary in 
1956 resulted in so-called the Brezhnev Doctrine.  
 
The doctrine stated that although "each socialist country had the right to 
determine the concrete form of its development along the path of socialism by taking 
account of the specific nature of their national conditions… the Soviet Union would not 
tolerate deviation from the principles of socialism and the restoration of capitalism.”47 
 
It produced a far more humane regime than other Communist ones – and 
undoubtedly more so than the primary seven-year period of uncontested Communist rule 
in Hungary. By and large, the Hungarians enjoyed much greater freedom of speech; they 
also had more freedom to write and travel when compared with their counterparts in the 
Soviet bloc. For example, not only were samizdat publications tolerated to a certain 
extent, but phone calls to foreigners did not come under careful scrutiny. 
Notwithstanding, although Kadar’s regime was not quite as repressive as most of its 
counterparts, it certainly was not a liberal one either. The monopoly of power was still 
retained by the Communist Party, where the role of the National Assembly was 
minimized to a mere rubber stamp. Even though the media enjoyed somewhat more 
latitude than in the rest of Communist regimes, it was still subjected to rather arduous 
restrictions. The secret police remained a feared tool of control despite the fact that it 
operated with fairly more restraint than in other Communist states.  
 
For all that time, the Polish Communist Party's First Secretary Władysław 
Gomułka embarked on liberalizing internal life in Poland while still holding on to most 
traditional communist economic and social aims. The legislative election of 1975 was 
followed by several years of moderate stabilization.48 
 
The Letter of Reconciliation of the Polish Bishops to the German Bishops was 
issued at the Conference of Polish Bishops in 1965. The following year, what was 
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initially supposed to be the celebration of the 1,000th anniversary of the Baptism of 
Poland organized by a number of bishops (among whom Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski was 
the most eminent figure) turned into a massive demonstration of the power and popularity 
of the Polish Catholic Church. 
 
Even though the artistic creativity had more often than not been compromised by 
political censorship, Gomulka along with his successors did enable the sophistication of 
cultural life. A substantial increase in production was achieved in the fields of music, 
literature, theatre and cinema among others. Not only the journalism of oblique 
understanding, but also a number of native varieties of popular trends coupled with the 
styles of mass culture from the West were well presented. Also, a wide variety of 
channels distributed uncensored information and works produced by émigré circles. The 
Radio Free Europe came to prominence as one of the most significant channels having 
this role.49 
 
When student demonstrations were suppressed in 1968, the liberalizing trend was 
reversed in 1968. An anti-Zionist campaign, which was primarily directed against 
Gomulka’s sympathizers within the party, eventually resulted in the emigration of the 
large percentage of Poland’s remaining Jewish population. The Polish People’s Army 
participated in the notorious Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. 
Two years later, a treaty was signed between the governments of Poland and West 
Germany. The treaty normalized the two countries’ relations and, more importantly, in it 
the Federal Republic recognized the post-war de-facto borders between Poland and East 
Germany.50 
 
In December 1970, the Government announced increase in the prices of essential 
consumer goods, thus causing strikes and disturbances in the port cities of Gdynia, 
Gdansk (Danzig) and Szczecin (Stettin). The riots expressed growing dissatisfaction with 
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both living and working conditions in the country. Gomulka was replaced with Edward 
Gierek as First Secretary of the Communist Party.51 
 
There was another attempt to increase food prices and it brought about the June 
1976 protests.52 The Workers' Defense Committee (Polish: Komitet Obrony Robotników 
or KOR) was set up as a form of response to the crackdown. This committee was 
comprised of dissident academics that were willing to unambiguously support industrial 
workers burdened with the authorities.53 
 
During the first half of the 1970s, Poland’s economic growth rate was one of the 
world’s highest given that it was invigorated by significant infusions of Western credit. 
However, a good deal of the borrowed capital was dissipated as a side effect of the 
centrally planned economy which was not capable of using the resources efficiently. By 
the end of decade, the growing debt burden became unendurable resulting in negative 
economic growth in 1979. 
 
Cardinal Karol Jozef Wojtyla, the Archbishop of Krakow, become Pope John 
Paul II (head of the Roman Catholic Church) in October 1978. Polish Catholics 
exuberantly greeted The Pope’s visit to Poland in June 1979, thus rejoicing his elevation 
to the papacy. 
 
The Polish foreign debt mounted an unbelievably considerable sum of $20 billion, 
which did not prevent the government to make another attempt to increase meat prices on 
July 1, 1980. By the end of August, a chain reaction of strikes practically paralyzed the 
coast of the Baltic Sea. This time, they succeeded in closing the majority of coal mines in 
the region of Silesia. Thus, Poland was on the verge of entering into a protracted crisis 
which was about to change the course of its future development. 
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An electrician named Lech Walesa led the employees of the Lenin Shipyard from 
Gdansk and they signed an agreement with the government on August 31. The agreement 
was consisted of 21 points and, eventually, it put an end to their strike. This triggered a 
series of similar agreements signed in Silesia and at Szczecin, the major city in the 
vicinity of the Baltic Sea. All these agreements had one crucial provision: they 
guaranteed the workers’ rights to strike and to establish independent labor unions. Upon 
the signing of the Gdansk Agreement, a new national union movement “Solidarity” swept 
Poland. 
 
The disclosure of widespread corruption coupled with the maladministration 
within the Party’s leadership and the Polish state only intensified dissatisfaction 
underlying the strikes. Stanislaw Kania replaced Gierek as First Secretary in September 
1980. 
 
After the Gdansk agreement, the Party’s authority deteriorated drastically. In 
December 1980, the Soviet Union reacted by forming a massive military build-up along 
Poland’s border so as to prevent further decrease in the Party’s reputation. The Minister 
of Defense, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, took the position of Prime Minister in February 
1981 and as early as in October 1981 was named First Secretary. During the September 
and October 1981, Solidarity held their first national congress and elected Lech Walesa 
as the national chairman of the union. 
 
The regime declared martial law on December 12/13 under which the army and 
Motorized Reserves of the Citizens' Militia (ZOMO) were deployed to crush the Union. 
Throughout the period of martial law in Poland (1981-1983), the ZOMO’s brutal 
activities against peaceful protestors frequently associated with Solidarity seen as the 
oppositionist movement along with the consequent lack of prosecution of the ones who 
were responsible for the deaths of protestors were key factors in overthrowing the 
communist regime. Nearly all Solidarity leaders and countless associated academics were 
either arrested or taken into custody. The US together with Western European countries 
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acted in response to martial law by imposing economic sanctions against both the Soviet 
Union and the Polish regime. The socio-political turmoil in Poland continued for a 
number of years thereafter.54 
 
After the Polish regime had attained some semblance of normality, it loosened 
then annulled martial law. As a result, martial law was suspended in December 1982. An 
insignificant number of political prisoners, such as Walesa, were released. Even though a 
partial amnesty was enacted and the formal ending of the martial law took place in July 
the following year, hundreds of political figures still remained imprisoned.55 
 
General amnesty was declared in September 1986. Consequently, the government 
released almost every political prisoner. However, the authorities kept on harassing 
Solidarity activists and dissidents throughout this period. A number of measures taken 
included Solidarity being still proscribed and its publications banned along with all 
independent newspapers and magazines being censored. Two circumstances raised the 
awareness of both the ruling establishment and opposition led by Solidarity about the 
necessity of overcoming the stalemate they ended in: unresolved economic crisis and 
dysfunctional social institutions. In order to break the stalemate, both sides opted for 
establishing a number of exploratory contacts.56 
 
In April, May and August 1988, a series of strikes across the country ensued as 
the result of the Polish government’s incapability to prevent further Poland’s economic 
decline. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union became progressively more destabilized so 
the Polish government had no other choice but to negotiate with Solidarity in the Polish 
Round Table Negotiations. In 1989, the subsequent Polish legislative election turned out 
to be one of the most prominent events which marked the fall of communism in Poland.                           
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Looking at Poland and Hungary in the 1980s one could see two very different 
pictures. On the one hand, Poland was in constant turmoil because Solidarity, an 
independent trade union led by Lech Walesa and supported in crucial moments by the 
Polish-born Pope John Paul II who became the leading opposition force in the society. By 
the end of 1981, this organization had nine million members, a quarter of Poland's 
population and three times as many as the PZPR had. General Jaruzelski who took 
control of the party and state apparatus went as far as proclaiming martial law in 1981 
and banning Solidarity in 1982, reportedly out of fear of Soviet intervention. However, 
Solidarity became even more popular among the citizens and it continued to work as an 
underground organization frustrating Jaruzelski’s efforts to effectively consolidate power. 
The whole country was at the crossroads and only a strong signal from Moscow could 
decide the winner.  
 
On the other hand, Hungary was rather peaceful in the 1980s as the secondary 
economy flourished under Kadar’s economic model. The workers were allowed to 
change their jobs, relocate and work part-time in small private firms, which resulted in 
the state’s loss of the monopoly over income sources.57 Moreover, the state could not 
control the housing market any more – by 1984, 55% of all new housing was constructed 
by the second economy. Also, a new set of laws legalized and regulated property rights in 
the second economy, which increased the sphere of legally protected rights and made 
possible for party members to become part of the new economic reality.58 This all paved 
the way for Hungary to go into 1989 with a society that has already started to transform 
from communism into market economy. 
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ROUNDTABLE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL 
PARTIES 
 
The legal maxim “rule of law” has been applied to two state systems. The concept 
named “Rechtsstaat” appeared chiefly in German legal theory and, to some degree, in 
Central-Eastern Europe. The core meaning implies that government administration 
functions in accordance with rules of law.59 The other system appeared after the Second 
World War as a result of the lessons learned from both from the German Third Reich 
and, to a smaller degree, from the Stalinist political system. According to this system, the 
rule of law bears a substantial value. The crucial difference between these models is that 
not only is the state primary, but it also governs in accordance with the law in Rechtsstaat 
(of a formal meaning).60             
 
It is generally true to say that in Eastern Europe and especially so in the countries 
at hand – Poland and Hungary – the conception of rule of law appeared neither in practice 
not theory. The very notion of limiting the ruling power with laws was not in consistence 
with the Byzantine legal and political traditions. According to the Eastern European 
culture, the rule of law was equaled with the sovereign will in a legal form.61 On the other 
side, such interpretation of law was not familiar to Hungary since its political culture was 
deeply rooted in Roman law. Although the idea of rule of law came into Hungarian legal 
system as early as in the thirteenth century, the legal development ensuing from the 
compromise with the Austrians in 1867 was fundamentally built on the concept of the 
formal rule of law until the First World War. Afterwards, Hungary essentially established 
a Central European legal system. Conversely, “socialist” political model and legal 
thinking of Eastern Europe were enforced in Hungary in the decades following the 
Second World War, which effectively cut up the institutional network of the rule of law. 
Two entirely distinct periods in the approach of Marxist political science and 
jurisprudence towards the problem of rule of law may be distinguished. The literature of 
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1950s, 1960s and that of 1970s abruptly introduced the institutions of socialist legality, 
thus flatly refusing the term “rule of law” on its own. Contrariwise, political theorists 
have conjoined the idea of the rule of law with the concept of the socialist state, thus 
supporting the ensuing socialist rule of law, scrutinizing the conditions for its 
implementation, and theorizing the organization of its political safeguards.62 
 
They launched a whole new set of ideologies which would demonstrate that 
socialist rule of law is actually a democratic state comprised of separate powers, ruled by 
its constitution, which operates to strengthen democratic institutions by initiating 
administrative courts, to promote the principles of self-government, empower true 
independence for judges, implement the rule of law in full and respect human rights 
through wide-ranging legislation. In case a socialist country proves it succeeded in 
incorporating these basic postulates, they qualify the country as a socialist rule of law. 
These and similar immeasurable changes which have taken place lately in the region put 
the realization of parliamentary democracy on the agenda with the purpose of  facilitating 
peaceful political transitions from the party-state to the rule of law as well as from the 
one-party system  into the multi-party system. What might serve as a good example for 
the countries transforming from a political system which used to be socialist into a 
system with a pluralistic rule of law is the Hungarian Constitution of 1989-1990. One of 
its provisions declares the principle of the sovereignty of the people: “The Republic of 
Hungary is an independent democratic constitutional state” where “all power belongs to 
the people.”63 Also, the people are protected against autocracy by the Constitution: “None 
of the organizations of society, neither of the state bodies nor of the citizens shall direct 
their activities towards acquiring, violently exercising, or exclusively welding power. 
Everyone shall be both entitled and obliged to take lawful measures against such 
endeavors.”64  
Both the separation of the Party from the public power and the principles of the 
multi-party system are guaranteed, as follows: “Political parties may – under observance 
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of the Constitution and the constitutional legal rules – be freely formed and freely 
operated in the Republic of Hungary.”65 Additionally, “the parties shall not directly 
exercise public power. Accordingly, no party shall have the right to guide any state 
body...”66  
 
Adopting the core of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the 
Hungarian Constitution declares that: “no person shall be deprived of his/her liberty 
unless reasons provided by law therefore subsist and the procedure provided by law is 
conducted.”67 The Hungarian Constitution reinstated the republican presidency along 
with the republican form of state by stating the following: “The President of the Republic 
is the head of state of Hungary; he/she embodies the unity of the nation and watches over 
the democratic operation of the mechanism of state.”68 The newly-created Court of 
Constitutionality scrutinizes the legal rules, whether or not they conform to the 
Constitution and fulfills other obligations referred to it by law: “If instances of 
incongruity with the Constitution are found, the Court of Constitutionality declares the 
Acts or other legal rules in question null and void.”69 Furthermore, the Constitution 
provides that “Everybody shall have the right to initiate the procedure of the Court of 
Constitutionality in cases provided by law.”70  
 
An ombudsman, a new institution, is initiated following the Polish and Western 
European models: “The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration shall be in 
charge of examining the shortcomings coming to his/her notice concerning constitutional 
rights, or having them examined, and taking general or individual measures for the  
remedy thereof.” 71 
 
To guarantee the objectivity and independence of the administration of justice, the 
Hungarian Constitution declares the following: “Judges shall be independent and subject 
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only to law. They shall not be members of political parties and shall not display any 
political activity.”72 Correspondingly, “public prosecutors shall neither be members of 
political parties nor display any political activities.”73 
 
One might interpret the above-mentioned provisions as a selection which 
demonstrates that the Hungarian modified constitution attempts to incorporate the major 
thrust of American and European legal development with Hungarian state and 
constitutional development. However, Hungary has never had a legal directive like the 
current one, which has brought about a significant rule of law built on constitutional basic 
principles. Obviously, this whole lawmaking process has only started; there is necessity 
to establish further rules of law and to rectify the ones which already exist. It is 
commonly known that the realization of the constitutional rule of law is heavily 
dependent not only on legal regulation, but also on other elements as well, among which 
the most prominent are the political ones. 
 
Lengthy as it may appear, the introduction to this chapter provides the reader of 
the paper with necessary backup information so much needed to understand the 
transitioning period on the political scene of Central-Eastern Europe at that time. Having 
this in mind, the author of this master thesis aimed at familiarizing his readers with the 
dichotomy between the government and its opposition marks the commencement of the 
roundtable negotiations.  
 
The roundtable negotiations between the regime and the opposition were held in 
Hungary and Poland in 1989 and the two processes were very different in nature, which 
determined the way the transitions to democracy would develop in the 1990s. In 
Hungary, the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) had already ceased to 
be the source of coercive and administrative authority and the regime was ready to 
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negotiate peaceful transfer of power.74 In Poland, the ruling elite was trying to make the 
opposition part of the system by giving Solidarity a role in it but at the same time 
maneuvering to keep the most important positions in the government, especially the 
command over the security services.75  
 
In the beginning, only the Hungarian communists were getting ready for the 
changes both countries would inevitably face. Janos Kadar was removed from the 
position of Secretary General in May 1988 when the alliance made between younger 
party apparatchiki, policy lobbies, technocratic elites, and leaders of local party 
organizations finally ended his long political career.76 His place was taken by Karoly 
Grosz but more importantly the most prominent positions in the party were now held by 
young ideologically unhampered technocrats like Janos Barecz, Imre Pozsgay, Miklos 
Nemeth, and Rezso Nyers. The stage was set for a peaceful transition that was made 
possible by decades of Kadar’s “goulash socialism”. Conversely, the PZPR was firmly in 
General Jaruzelski’s autocratic hands and his idea of changes that were ahead did not go 
further than shifting some responsibility for the bad economic and political situation. At 
that point Poland’s inflation rate was close to 600%, substantial foreign debt was 
increasing, food shortages were an everyday phenomenon, and the manufacturing sector 
all but collapsed.  
 
Further, the opposition did not have any time to lose either - Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF), a political and cultural movement based on Christian 
democracy and the traditions of “people’s nationalism” was formed in 1987. Only a year 
later, a group of young lawyers founded the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ). 
This organization was markedly different because it was against even the reformist 
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version of communism and was mainly composed of young outspoken advocates who 
grew in popularity on the account of their unique political stance. Also, the Network of 
Free Democratic Initiatives that would later become the Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SZDSZ) was formed in 1988. This group stood for a reduction of the role of the state 
and the protection of individual rights and it was the third of the three key non-
communist parties in Hungary.77 
 
On the other hand, Solidarity was the main opposition movement in Poland. 
Truly, Lech Walesa’s organization can be best described as movement because it lacked 
the contours and clear political long-term goals of a well-established political party. 
Although it can be noted that Hungarian newly-formed parties were still not clearly 
defined, which took time and several election cycles, the most important of them did have 
some ideological background that kept together the members and activists, at least in the 
beginning. Solidarity’s only ambition was to overthrow the communist regime – the 
movement had no real plan to change Poland.78 
 
In Hungary, the opposition parties mentioned above (MDF, FIDESZ, and the 
Network of Free Democratic Initiatives), Committee for an Act of Historical Justice 
(TIB) that demanded rehabilitation of the 1956 veterans, and two associations of 
intellectuals met between March and June of 1989 at what came to be known as the 
Opposition Round Table (ORT). Their goal was to devise a strategy before entering into 
negotiations with the MSZMP in order to prevent the communists from using their 
organizational structure to use the old “divide and conquer” tactics. Consequently, they 
agreed to negotiate only about holding free elections and not about what kind of political 
system would follow. While this was going on the dominant reformist wing of the 
MSZMP sent another clear message that it was ready to change and accept democracy 
and free elections – the symbolic Iron Curtain was finally cut when the borders of 
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Hungary and Austria were opened, which enabled thousands of people to escape East 
Germany and seek asylum in the West.  
 
In Poland, the first talks between Solidarity’s leader Walesa and the regime 
started on August 31st, 1988 after a series of strikes that rocked Poland in April, May and 
August of the same year. The strikes came as a response to the government’s inability to 
stop the economic downfall and Jaruzelski had to de facto recognize Solidarity and began 
negotiations with the mediating role of the Catholic Church. These talks broke down in 
October but were restarted in February of 1989, this time as a roundtable discussion 
between the regime and the opposition.  
 
Unlike their Hungarian counterparts, Polish roundtable participants agreed on 
much more than just the date of the first election and the way in which it would be carried 
out. Representatives of the regime headed by General Jaruzelski and members of the 
opposition (Solidarity and some other not so significant dissident groups) headed by Lech 
Walesa reached a deal on holding a semi-free multi-party election in June, legalization of 
independent trade unions, pay raises, introduction of the office of President (which made 
the position of the PZPR Secretary General irrelevant), and the limit of competence for 
the future Sejm (lower house) and the Senate (upper house of parliament). By trying to 
define the political system even before the election, and through securing the most 
important positions in government in advance, the regime was just trying to co-opt 
opposition leaders into its own ranks. The nature of the electoral system and the rules for 
conducting the first semi-free elections will be explained in detail in the next section. 
In the meantime, the negotiations between the ORT and the regime in Hungary 
began on June 13th, 1989 – the same day the semi-free elections were being held in 
Poland. Most importantly, unlike their Polish counterparts Hungarian communists 
decided to accept the opposition’s offer to talk only about holding the first free multi-
party elections and not to go into how the political system would be organized 
afterwards. Furthermore, at a party congress in October 1989 the Communists agreed to 
give up their monopoly on power, paving the way for free elections in March 1990. The 
party's name was changed from the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party to simply the 
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Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). Only a week later, on October 23rd, 1989 the 
government proclaimed the new Hungarian Republic. The participants of the roundtable 
were free to negotiate about the course for the country since the Soviet Union had agreed 
to withdraw its troops from Hungary by June 1991. The result in the end was a set of 
rules for the elections which were held in March 1990.  
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THE FIRST ELECTIONS 
 
This section will start with an overview of relevant political parties, then go on to 
describe the rules for conducting the first elections and will be concluded with the 
election results and their analysis. At the time, the communist successor parties were the 
only organized political machines but only the Hungarian regime saw the first elections 
as the opportunity to transform itself into a modern European socialist party. 
 
Thus the newly formed Hungarian MSZP in preparations for the 1990 elections 
committed to democratic socialism, protection of private property in a mixed economy, 
and free competition of political parties. They presented themselves as “reformed 
communists” and “democratic socialists” stating that Hungary’s history did not discredit 
socialism per se because “that was no socialism”.79 The new head of party Rezso Nyers 
who was the main architect of Kadar’s New Economic Mechanism was chosen as the 
leader with enough expert credentials to outweigh the ideological ballast the party was 
carrying from the communist past. This marked the victory of the reformist wing of the 
party headed by young experts, which had been in constant conflict with the hardliners 
throughout the 1980s.80 Moreover, their chances of staying in power looked very well in 
the summer of 1989 when the polls showed they enjoyed a big lead over the opposition. 
This lead dwindled in the months before the election as other political parties with much 
less experience and with only the very basic party infrastructure began to make their 
views known to the public. 
 
On the other hand, the Polish PZPR did not really transform itself until after the 
election. Their goal was not to adjust so they could be competitive in a free election but 
quite the opposite – General Jaruzelski thought it would be more practical if the political 
system was reformed in such a way that it would co-opt the opposition leaders and thus 
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leave him personally and his crumbling communist party in power. Although Solidarity 
accepted to have semi-free elections and the election of Jaruzelski himself to the newly 
created position of President it turned out that even this arrangement could not keep the 
regime in place but this matter will be addressed shortly. 
 
On the other side of the political spectrum there was a myriad of parties that were 
campaigning in an effort to contest the communists. The two biggest opposition parties 
were the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) in Hungary and Solidarity in Poland. The 
former was founded by conservative intellectuals and they defined it as center-right 
Christian-democratic party. As all similar parties in those days it was very vocal about 
being anti-communist and patriotic in the sense that it advocated the return to the basic 
values of Hungarian society which was destroyed by the Soviet occupation and willing 
collaboration of their domestic cronies. Further, the party did not spend much time 
explaining how exactly the new economic program should be implemented or how the 
vast improvements in living standard were to be achieved, which of course did not hinder 
it from promising all these things and much more. Moreover, the MDF was constantly 
riddled by infighting between its conservative leadership and sometimes very radical 
right-wing grassroots.81 Nonetheless, in the political atmosphere that prevailed in 
Hungary on the eve of 1990 elections this party was gaining more and more support 
among the populace. 
 
In addition, Polish Solidarity was more a movement than a political party and its 
greatest asset before the elections was the fact that it ran practically as the only viable 
opposition to the regime. This meant that it received the votes of many people who did 
not support Solidarity per se but were disapproving of Jaruzelski’s faltering government. 
Also, what helped Polish voters warm up to Walesa’s party was that the elections were 
only semi-free because the PZPR could count on controlling the Sejm (only 35% of the 
seats were up for grabs) and only the Senate was open for all candidates. This was 
rightfully seen as unjust and Solidarity’s now famous At High Noon posters called on the 
Polish electorate to once and for all defeat the communists. In fact, Solidarity did not 
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expect to win a significant number of seats and the PZPR was not overly concerned about 
the results of the election, which was to prove a fatal mistake. 
 
Further, in Hungary on the anti-communist side there were a number of different 
political parties. Some of them had roots in pre-communist history like the Independent 
Smallholders Party (FKGP), which fought for the return of the confiscated land to 
farmers or Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), which was based on religious 
(mostly catholic) constituency and had its support among rural, older, uneducated, 
religious, and female voters. Among the new parties, except for the MDF that has been 
already discussed, prominent parties were the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), 
which began as a radical-liberal alternative party that set the membership age limit at 35, 
and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), which started as an economically liberal 
party with constituency among urban, secularized, educated, younger, and more 
cosmopolitan voters.82  
       
In Poland, Solidarity was the only opposition to the ruling PZPR. Some of the 
other parties that participated in the election were regime satellites like United Peasants’ 
Party (ZSL), Democratic Party (SD), and three religious and social organizations also 
controlled by the regime – PAX Association, Christian-Social Union (UCHS), and Polish 
Catholic and Social Association (PZKS). 
 
Further, the electoral systems in both countries were very complex and the 
Hungarians decided on a mixture of proportional representation (PR) and majoritarian 
system. Their law stipulated that if a candidate won 50% in his or her constituency in the 
first round they were considered elected. However, if nobody had more votes than 
everybody else then the top three candidates, or all those with 15% or more qualified for 
the second round where all one needed was a simple plurality. The threshold for party 
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lists, which competed under the rules of PR was 4% nationally (in subsequent elections 
this was raised to 5%), and seats were awarded according to the results in each county.83 
 
In comparison, Poland had only a semi-free election, which in this particular case 
meant that the whole process was to be but a formality as most of the seats were, 
according to the agreement reached at the Roundtable negotiations, allocated to the PZPR 
and its satellites. As a part of that deal it was arranged for the communists to get the most 
important portfolios in the next government, newly-created position of President for 
General Jaruzelski, and it was only the upper chamber of parliament called the Senate 
(100 seats) that was up for grabs. The 65% of the seats in the lower chamber called the 
Sejm were reserved for the communists and their allies – the PZPR was allocated 173 
seats, United Peasants’ Party (ZSL) 76, the Democratic Party (SD) 27, PAX Association 
10, Christian-Social Union (UCHS) 8, and Polish Catholic and Social Association 
(PZKS) 5. Since the Sejm had 460 seats that left 161 seats (35%) to be filled in the 
election. Further, the voters were to cast their votes for the candidates themselves, and it 
was not even permitted to put the name of the party next to its candidate’s name. In 
addition, the voters were supposed to choose their candidate not by circling the number 
before his name or the name itself but by crossing out every other candidate’s name on 
the list. The system was obviously devised by the PZPR in order to confuse the voters 
since the working hypothesis was that the Solidarity candidates were not very well 
known and that this will cost them a considerable number of votes. However, Solidarity 
did well to publicize the names of its candidates and this communist ploy to confuse large 
number of voters obviously failed. 
 
The first multi-party elections were held in June 1989 in Poland and in March 
1990 in Hungary. In Poland, to the great surprise of the regime that was so much in 
denial that the PZPR main body discussed several days before the ballots were cast how 
the West would react if the opposition does not win any seats, Solidarity won 92 seats out 
                                                 
83Mark Pittaway, “Hungary” In Developments in Central and East European Politics 3, edited by Stephen 
White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 63. 
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of 100 in the Senate and 160 out of 161 in the Sejm. The victory of Walesa’s movement 
was astounding and it basically ended the communist rule in Poland because it created an 
unstoppable momentum for the opposition that in spite of all institutional obstacles 
created by the regime paved the way for Mazowiecki’s concentration government and 
Lech Walesa’s triumph in the presidential election in 1990. 
 
In Hungary, things were much easier because the elections were free and the 
outcome did not surprise anyone. The results are shown in the table below.  
  
Party Votes in % Mandates 
 
Mandates in % 
MDF 24.73 164 42.49 
SZDSZ 21.39 92 23.81 
FKGP 11.73 44 11.40 
MSZP 10.89 33 8.55 
FIDESZ 8.95 21 5.44 
KDNP 6.46 21 5.44 
Others 4.17 7 2.81 
Source: Parliamentary Elections, 1990 (Budapest: MTA Tarsadalomtudomanyi Intezet, 1990) 
 
It is clear that in the anti-communist frenzy that took place in Hungary before the 
election the parties that fared the best were the MDF and SZDSZ while the biggest loser 
was the MZSP that won only 10.89% of the vote, which translated into measly 33 seats in 
parliament. This meant that Rezso Nyers had to be replaced and his position as head of 
the party was taken by Gyula Horn. Clearly, the reformed communists had the big task of 
redefining their party and disassociating themselves from the compromising past. On the 
other hand, the anti-communist parties and especially the triumphant MDF had to come 
up with a coalition that would unite not yet clearly defined political entities around the 
same set of goals. The slogans that could be heard across the continent about democracy, 
free market and the return to Europe did not give any prescription for how to achieve 
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these worthy goals and parties built around intellectuals, dissidents, workers, and other 
individuals with little or no political experience had to deliver on a host of promises 
much more experienced policy makers never would have made. The first step in that 
direction in Hungary was made when the MDF made a coalition government with the 
FKGP and the KDNP that gave the ruling parties control over almost 60% of the seats in 
parliament. The first Prime Minister was Jozsef Antall of the MDF but he died in 1993 
and was succeeded by the Interior Minister Peter Boross.  
  
The situation in Poland, as usual, proved to be more complicated. The 
overwhelming victory of Solidarity changed everything because the communists could no 
longer claim they had any legitimacy to rule the country. Moreover, in this political 
climate they were abandoned by the ZSL and the SD that were created as their trusted 
satellites. Nonetheless, the first mandate to form a grand coalition government was given 
to a PZPR representative General Czeslaw Kiszczak but as he could not form government 
the mandate of Prime Minister was given to Solidarity candidate Tadeusz Mazowiecki. 
On 12 September, Mr. Mazowiecki's Cabinet was approved. Among its 23 members were 
eight Deputies, two Senators and representatives of the OKP, PZPR, ZSL and SD parties. 
The delegitimized PZPR struggled to retain any influence on how the country was run but 
to no effect. Although general Jaruzelski was elected President in parliament he could not 
control what the government was doing and he could not fight off attempts to have a 
popular election for that position in 1990 when he had to resign. That same year the 
PZPR was terminated and Aleksander Kwasniewski formed the Social Democratic Party 
(SDRP) on it ruins. 
  
 However, things were not going smoothly for Solidarity as cracks started to 
appear within the organization. The differences between Mazowiecki and increasingly 
popular Walesa were widening as the Prime Minister was a representative of the dissident 
intelligentsia while Walesa, an electric technician by profession, had his base among 
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blue-collar workers.84 Mazowiecki’s government was primarily concerned with the 
improving impoverished Polish economy through the shock therapy devised by the 
Minister of Finance and Deputy PM Balcerowicz (Solidarity member). This entailed 
rapid privatization and massive inflow of foreign investments that was unfortunately 
followed by high inflation which began when the last communist government freed most 
of the food prices.85 Further, the zloty fell in purchasing power by 40% fueling citizens’ 
disenchantment with the new government and playing directly into Walesa’s rhetoric 
about “cleaning the house” and finally getting rid of the communist legacies once and for 
all.86  
  
 Riding on this wave of anti-communist sentiment and easily made promises 
Walesa won the presidential election in 1990. In the first round of voting he received 
39.96% of the vote leaving Stanislaw Tyminski at 23.10% and Tadeusz Mazowiecki a 
distant third with 18.08%. The second round of voting was even better for Walesa 
because he received 74.25 % to Tyminski’s 25.75%. This landslide strengthened his 
legitimacy against the parliament and Walesa would use this repeatedly to try to arrogate 
more power to himself and stall parliament on decisions he thought were deleterious for 
Poland.  
  
 It is hard to say what would have happened if Hungary had had its first election in 
1989 before Poland. It could be that its progress would have been slower while the 
opposition leaders maybe could have gained more at the Roundtable negotiations in 
Warsaw. However, if one has in mind that the Hungarian communist party in the 1980s 
was taken over by the regime blandos and that they saw a legitimate chance to become 
part of the new pluralist society while Poland was run by a de facto military dictator who 
                                                 
84Rudolf L. Tokes “Party Politics and Political Participation in Post-Communist Hungary,” in The 
Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 77. 
85 Jane L. Curry, “Poland: The Politics of God’s Playground,” in Central and East European Politics: From 
Communism to Democracy, edited by Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 171-172. 
86 Rudolf L. Tokes “Party Politics and Political Participation in Post-Communist Hungary,” in The 
Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 76. 
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did not see how the party could adapt to a multi-party system one would have to conclude 
that it was precisely because of these things that things developed the way they did. In 
other words, the different communist traditions of the two countries created different 
regimes in the 1980s and they in turn made possible for divergent regime-opposition 
negotiations in 1989.  
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  DEMOCRACY EXPERIMENT AND INSTITUTION BUILDING 
 
 As Schopflin rightfully argued, although the communists were not liked during 
their reign they did make a lasting imprint on the society. People in post-communist 
countries still expected economic homogeneity, universal employment, a welfare state, 
and a better living standard albeit they did not want any rapid changes in the way they 
lived their everyday lives.87 This is exactly what leaders of the new governments had to 
deal with in Hungary and Poland. Although it was understandable that citizens wanted to 
live better after fifty years of austerity it was practically impossible to find an economic 
formula that would reconcile what people believed were the good sides of communism 
and vicissitudes of capitalist society.  
 
In Poland this meant that Mazowiecki’s government had an impossible task. It 
comprised Solidarity, the discredited PZPR, and their former satellites and its policies 
were guided by Mazowiecki himself and the Minister of Finance Balcerowicz who 
thought his shock therapy could revitalize the economy. However, the government’s 
authority was crucially shaken when its Prime Minister came third in presidential 
elections in 1990 and Lech Walesa began to use his authority to undermine Mazowiecki’s 
cabinet. In this atmosphere it was just a matter of time before the first fully free general 
election was held and this finally happened on October 27th, 1991. Thus the first post-
communist Polish government fell due to great expectations of the society which was not 
truly ready to transform yet and was still looking for a quick fix it was duly promised by 
political demagogues.  
  
 Further, as Tismaneanu noted the old paradigms were gone forever but new ones 
were yet to emerge as corruption, political fragmentation, and cliquishness got in the way 
of stability and normality. People were looking for the magical savior and the quick fix 
that would bypass their grey transition reality and all of a sudden scores of political 
                                                 
87 George Schopflin, "Obstacles to Liberalism in Post-Communist Politics," East European Politics and 
Societies, (Winter 1991), 191-193. 
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parties often known only by the name of their leader were there to offer them whatever 
they thought the voters were craving most.88  
 
In Poland this was manifested in the 1991 election when twenty-nine parties and 
coalitions fielded candidates for parliament while most of them had up to then been 
members of Solidarity. On the other hand, the fragmentation was also visible in the 
Hungarian parliament which started with six parties and a small group of independents in 
1990 and four years later ended up with about twenty parties (some of them had only one 
or two MPs) as well as different platforms, factions and policies in each of the six main 
parties. For example, the leading MDF had trouble holding on to its members and 
sympathizers. When the conservative Joszef Antall became Prime Minister he drove out 
of the party everybody who did not wish the MDF to be so far to the right, and after three 
years in office Istvan Csurka led a radical-right wing that broke off from the party as they 
deemed its policies too leftist. Moreover, as the MDF’s popularity sank in the polls many 
backbenchers chose to join other parties or just become independent MPs.89 
 
While the Hungarians were learning valuable lessons about democracy watching 
fragmentation in the parliament the Polish voters had many more opportunities to choose 
the politicians who would lead them as their institutions worked in a markedly different 
manner. Namely, Hungary had a pure parliamentary system in which the position of the 
president was only symbolic as he was elected in parliament for a five-year term. For 
example, Mátyás Szűrös was elected in 1990 and he served two terms until finally 
retiring in 2000. He was a member of the Alliance of Free Democrats but was seen 
mostly as a very well-respected politician who was above party politics and hence he 
enjoyed great popularity among ordinary Hungarians.  
 
                                                 
88 Vladimir Tismaneanu , Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist 
Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 42. 
89 Rudolf L. Tokes “Party Politics and Political Participation in Post-Communist Hungary,” in The 
Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 128. 
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On the other hand, the Poles opted for a semi-presidential system in which the 
power is shared between the government and the president who can veto any law and is 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. As the country was only starting its journey 
towards working democracy the rules were not well defined and Lech Walesa was 
making the most of his authority and legal prerogatives to wrest as much power as 
possible from other branches of government and effectively turn the system into a 
presidential one. Also, Mazowiecki’s government was weak and could not cope with the 
pressure the dire economic situation and restless Walesa were putting on it and Poland 
got another opportunity to choose its government – this time in a fully free general 
election. 
 
The elections itself were a demonstration of how divided the Solidarity movement 
had become since 1989 as over one hundred political parties were registered on the eve of 
the elections. Some of them were very eye-catching to foreigners like the Polish Friends 
of Beer Party led by a popular Polish comedy actor Janusz Rewiński that actually 
managed to get into the parliament and won sixteen seats. After President Walesa vetoed 
two electoral draft laws a third was finally passed and it specified that the system of 
proportional representation would be used with the stipulation that 391 deputies would be 
chosen from regional lists and 69 deputies would be chosen from national lists tied to the 
regional lists.90 The results of the elections are shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 Rudolf L. Tokes “Party Politics and Political Participation in Post-Communist Hungary,” in The 
Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 78-79. 
Vladimir Ilic 
ÖMES 
 55
NATIONAL SUMMARY OF VOTES AND SEATS 
============================================================================= 
Registered voters:                                    27,516,166   
Total votes:                                          11,887,949  43.2 
Invalid votes:                                           669,347  05.6 
Valid votes:                                          11,218,602  94.4 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Party                                                  Votes      %     Seats 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Alliance of Women against Life's Hardships (SKPTZ)         1,922  00.0    1 
Catholic Election Action (WAK)                           980,304  08.7   49 
Christian Democrats (CD)                                 265,179  02.2    5 
Citizen's Centre Agreement (POC)                         977,344  08.7   44  
Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN)            841,738  07,5   46 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)                         1,344,820  12.0   60  
Democratic Party (SD)                                    159,017  01.4    1 
Democratic-Social Movement (RDS)                          51,656  00.5    1 
Democratic Union (DU)                                  1,382,051  12.3   62 
Electoral Committee of Orthodox Believers (KWP)           13,788  00.1    1 
German Minority (MN)                                     132,059  01.2    7 
Great Poland and Poland (WPP)                             23,188  00.2    1 
Independent Self-Governing Trade Union - Solidarity      566,553  05.0   27 
Krakow Coalition of Solidarity with the President (KKSP)  27,586  00.2    1 
Labour Solidarity (SP)                                   230,975  02.1    4 
Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD)                        839,978  07.5   37 
Party of Christian Democrats (PCD)                       125,314  01.1    4 
Party X (PX)                                              52,735  00.5    3 
Peasant Accord (PL)                                      613,626  05.5   28 
Peasant Election Alliance (LPW)                           42,031  00.4    1 
Peasant Unity (JL)                                        18,902  00.2    1 
Podhalan Union (ZP)                                       26,744  00.2    1 
Polish Party of Friends of Beer (PPPP)                   367,106  03.0   16 
Polish Peasant Party - PA (PSL-SP)                       972,952  08.7   48  
Polish Western Union (PZZ)                                26,053  00.2    4 
Silesian Autonomy Movement (RAS)                          40,061  00.4    2 
Solidarity 80 (S 80)                                      12,769  00.1    1 
Union of Great Poles (UWL)                                 9,019  00.1    1 
Union of Political Realists (UPR)                        253,024  02.2    3 
Others                                                   820,108  07.3    -          
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total                                                 11,218,602        460 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Elections to the Sejm 
Source: Essex University 
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 It is clear from the results that Poland could count on an unstable parliament and 
untenable governments that would be in constant collision with the headstrong president. 
Furthermore, out of 29 parties that entered the Sejm as many as 11 had only one MP. As 
could be expected, after the election the country was run by a series of weak governments 
that had to make further concessions to Walesa in the new 1992 “Little Constitution” 
when the semi-presidential system was cemented because the president was trying to 
increase his power vis-à-vis his former Solidarity allies in the parliament. It soon became 
obvious that after the 1989 election the parties became too fragmented and that they 
failed to establish themselves among the voters. Fewer and fewer people voted, the center 
disappeared leaving parties with undefined ideologies focused more on their leaders and 
personal grievances than on economic and social policies.91 All that the reformed 
communists had to do now is sit and wait for enough people to get disappointed in the 
1989 freedom fighters. 
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THE RETURN OF THE CASTAWAYS 
 
 As Bunce and Csanadi fairly argued the essential characteristic of post-
communism in Hungary is fluidity. If the communism was a political machine for 
controlling the populace post-communism is indeed the absence of much structure.92 In 
transitioning Hungary and one may add Poland as well, it was not wise to expect liberal 
politics to develop without a capitalist economy that would define the interest of 
important players because this is the only thing that truly brings stability. Intellectuals 
who fought communists on ideological grounds were expected to turn into politicians 
overnight and when they refused or could not deliver people became more doubtful of 
democracy. New ministers had never held a government job before and MPs could not 
find their way in new offices at the moment when the voters expected them to work 
miracles and undo almost fifty years of communism.93 
  
 It soon became clear that the next elections can be won solely on the basis of 
concrete plans for the economy and society in general. Nobody could present their case 
better than the reformed communists who spent enough time in governing bodies to know 
what kind of work they could expect to do and who they could count on to help them. In 
Hungary, the MSZP promised economic growth as well as protection for pensioners, 
parents, young people, and the unemployed. They also presented themselves as the party 
of experts, pragmatists and “de-ideologized technocrats” interested solely in 
professionalizing and westernizing the country. One of their slogans in the run-up to the 
1994 parliamentary elections was “Power to the professionals!”94 What it basically all 
boiled down to was the promise that they were not the old communists of the Cold-War 
era but instead young professionals who had some experience with running a country. 
 Similarly, after additional two years of incompetent Solidarity governments that 
could not even make peace with their former leader Lech Walesa, the Polish voters 
                                                 
92 Valerie Bunce and Maria Csanadi, “Uncertainty in the Transition; Post-Communism in Hungary,” in East 
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decided they had enough of makeshift politicians whose credentials were often only that 
they were good Catholics who had fought the communists. In 1993 Walesa finally 
dissolved the parliament and called for new elections. The new electoral rules stipulated 
that parties needed to win 5% of the popular vote and coalitions reach the 8% threshold to 
enter parliament, which reduced the number of parties in the Sejm from twenty-nine to 
seven. The coalition of left-wing parties formed in 1991 called the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) and their natural ally the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) were clear favorites 
before the elections because they banked on the previous governments’ poor performance 
and ran a campaign that promised to continue the transition but also not to neglect the 
people who had problems adjusting to the new reality. The results of election in Poland in 
1993 and Hungary in 1994 are shown below. 
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NATIONAL SUMMARY OF VOTES AND SEATS 
============================================================================= 
Registered voters:                                    26,677,302   
Total votes:                                          14,415,586  54.0 
Invalid votes:                                           619,359  04.3 
Valid votes:                                          13,796,227  95.7 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Party                                                  Votes      %     Seats 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD)                  2,815,169  20.4  171  
German Minority of Opole Silesia                          60,770  00.4    3 
Germans of Katowice Province (NWK)                        23,396  00.2    1  
Polish Peasant Party (PSL)                             2,124,367  15.4  132  
Democratic Union (UD)                                  1,460,957  10.6   74  
Labour Union (UP)                                      1,005,004  07.3   41  
Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN)               795,487  05.8   22  
Non Party Reform Bloc (BBWR)                             746,653  05.4   16 
Others                                                 2,186,799  19.5    - 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total                                                 11,218,602        460 
Elections to the Sejm 
Source: Essex University 
 
Political Party or 
Coalition 
Number of Votes % of Votes Number of Seats % of Seats 
MSZP 1,781,504 32.99 209 54.14 
SZDSZ 1,065,889 19.74 70 17.88 
MDF 633,770 11.74 38 9.84 
FKGP 476,272 8.82 26 6.74 
KDNP 379,344 7.03 22 5.70 
FIDESZ 379,344 7.03 20 5.18 
Agrarian Alliance 113,384 2.10 1 0.26 
Entrepreneurs’ 
Party  
33,367 0.62 1 0.26 
Source: Party Politics and Political and Political Participation in Post-communist Hungary p.137 
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It is clear from these results that the reformed communists managed to convince 
the voters that they were not a danger for the new pluralist system but actually a working 
part of it. They successfully shed the anathema of authoritarianism and became a viable 
choice in democratic societies that would not vote just against something; politicians 
from now on would actually have to come up with a platform that could motivate voters 
to vote for something. On the other hand, the right-wing parties had to concentrate on 
consolidating their strength in parliament and criticizing the newly elected government in 
the same way they were criticized while they were in power – mostly with objections to 
the way the reforms were carried out and the effects they had on the population. 
 
Further, the Hungarian socialists decided to make a coalition government with the 
SZDSZ although they could form the government themselves because they wanted a 
more stable government and someone to share the responsibility for the reforms with 
them. Also, the SLD made a coalition with the PSL and created the first Polish 
government that would serve the full four-year term. The SLD’s victory became 
complete when its leader Kwasniewski defeated Walesa in the presidential elections in 
1995 thus leaving the former anti-communist coalition in complete disarray. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The main task of this paper was to examine the transition of political societies in 
Hungary and Poland from 1989 to 1994 and 1993 respectively and to try to explain how 
the different choices that were made in the very beginning of the negotiated transitions 
influenced the development of political societies in different ways. My main hypothesis 
was that because of the differently negotiated transitions in Poland and Hungary the 
latter’s party system fared easier in the beginning, had more stable governments and 
better defined political society although the reformed communists came back to power at 
roughly the same time in both countries. Also, it is safe to say that the return to power of 
the reformed communists in the mid 1990s cannot be attributed to the sudden realization 
of ordinary citizens that communism worked after all but to the rejection of all ideologies 
and to testing different political options for the first time in the second half of the 20th 
century. 
 
It is clear from the developments in Poland and Hungary that differently 
negotiated transitions at the roundtable negotiations had an important effect on the way in 
which the political society developed in each country. In Poland, Solidarity agreed to 
semi-free elections which produced an unstable government that fell short of delivering a 
markedly higher life standard for its citizens. As they opted for a semi-presidential 
system the Poles had more elections than the Hungarians and a higher fragmentation of 
parties in parliament. On the other hand, the Hungarians had a much softer communist 
regime in 1989, which resulted in the adoption of a pure parliamentary system in a 
referendum that year and fully free elections in 1990. This in turn eliminated the 
possibility of conflict between the president and parliament as all power was consolidated 
in the government and its Prime Minister. As a result, Hungary had fewer parties in the 
Parliament and fewer elections, which made the political society of this country much 
more stable than that of Poland. 
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However, having these differences in mind, one cannot escape the fact that both 
countries saw the return of the reformed communists to power in mid 1990s. It is 
important to stress here that this paper does not deal with transitions of Hungary and 
Poland, but rather with the transitions of their political societies. It is not contradictory 
then that although Hungary had a much more stable political society than Poland both 
systems went through some of the same stages on their way to democracy consolidation. 
The return of the MSZP and the SLD-PSL coalition to power in 1994 and 1993 was a 
milestone for democracy as it legitimized the left end of the political spectrum and their 
election platforms and later policies in government showed they became part of the new 
pluralist system.  
 
Further, the reason for their comeback can be seen in the four years preceding it. 
Poland had a series of anti-communist governments made up of people whose best 
credentials were often that they were dissidents or members of Solidarity in the 
communist period. People expected the new authorities to let them keep their everyday 
habits that leaned on the welfare role of the state while at the same time they wanted their 
living standard to improve significantly. Although Hungary’s political system was more 
stable, the citizens’ expectations were virtually the same and the government was still not 
able to meet them. On the other hand, the shady dealings of many representatives of the 
new system, corruption, and incompetence left people wondering not if communism was 
a better option but whether ideology should be the only grounds on which they should 
cast their ballots. 
 
Consequently, the reformed communists who presented themselves as de-
ideologized technocrats and skilled professionals managed to regain people’s confidence 
and trump their opponents at the polls in 1993 and 1994. This did not mean that 
democracy was a short-lived experiment for Hungary and Poland. On the contrary, this 
shook up the political scene and rounded it up leaving left-wing and right-wing parties to 
compete in future elections giving the voters the opportunity to make up their own mind 
without the fear that democracy itself would be in danger.         
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In the end, both Hungary and Poland’s political arenas became democratic 
although different institutional solutions stemming from roundtable negotiations made 
the former more politically stable than the latter. Poland had more elections and political 
turbulence but just like Hungary it went through political fragmentation, infighting, and 
the return of the reformed communists to power in the mid 1990s. The last did not 
destroy democracy as many feared at the time but actually strengthened it by re-
legitimizing both sides of the political spectrum.   
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